

Multiresolution Platform to Verify and Validate Cooperative Driving Automation Functionalities in Contested Environments



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Introduction

- **Education:**

- MSc: Aerospace Engineering, University of Florida, 2019
- PhD: Mechanical Engineering, University of Florida, 2020
- BSc, MSc, PhD: Electrical Engineering-control systems, 2010, 2012, 2015

- **Current position:**

Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering

- **Research Interests:**

Security of Networked Control Systems; Testing and verification of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles; Security of Multi-agent Systems

- **Previous positions:**

- Assistant Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida Polytechnic University
- Director of Advance Mobility Institute, Florida Polytechnic University
- Research Assistant Professor, Florida International University
- System Development Engineer, PLC International Inc

RANCS Team



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Jonas Cunningham-Rush



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
Nathan Gardner



Nathan Gardner


Introduction

- According to a report of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), **94 percent of the 37,461** traffic fatalities in 2016 were due to human error.
- Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), including marine and robots, have the potential to add great value, but to be effective, they must be shown to be **safe and secure**.



Autonomous Vehicles


- Despite all of AV's advantages, the major barrier for wide-scale adoption of AVs is **the test and verification** regime to safety and security.
- To address this barrier, a process, which builds an *engineering argument* for assuring **safety and security**, must be developed.



Challenges

- **Scenario Testing and Verification**

- How to generate interesting edge cases?
- Do we need to test for all possible cases?
- Can we eliminate similar scenarios using equivalent classes theory?
- Can we do the coverage analysis?



- **Developed a language of factors that define a scene**
- **Factors translated into parameters for formulation**
- **Formulation enables pseudo-random test generation**

$$\left(\begin{array}{ccc} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \end{array} \right) \begin{bmatrix} d_{rlong} \\ V_{rel} \\ d_{rlat} \\ d_{long} \\ d_{lat} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{cases} pass & if \begin{cases} d_{rlong} \geq 0 \\ V_{rel} > 0 \\ d_{long} > 0 \end{cases} \\ fail & Otherwise \end{cases}$$

Challenges

- **Scenario Testing and Verification**
 - How can we systematically learn from real-world crashes?
 - Can we test future CAVs based on real-world crashes?



Challenges

- **Environmental and sensor testing**

- How the perception of CAV performs under electromagnetic interferences?
- How to test CAVs and their perception under different weather conditions?



But my AV worked in Arizona?

Challenges

- **Language of Driving**
 - Do we have a language for driving?
 - How human in the loop can be tested?
 - How ethical are CAVs?



Security Challenges


- Cyber-physical attack
 - How to test the security of CAVs in critical situations?
 - How to test the stability of CAVs under faults, failures, and cyber-physical attacks?

Challenges:


- Cost of redesign and collaboration problem
- Random attacks
- Resource constraints
- Communication protocols are not well designed
- Intelligent attacks



Testing Environments



Mixed Reality Platform







- Modes of operation:**
- Manual
 - ViL
 - Automated
 - Autonomous Level 3+

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Scenario Generation


- Game engines and random scenario generation (coverage and equivalent Classes)
- Scenario abstraction from real life
- Digital Twin Environment



Scenario abstraction from real crashes



Attack and Fault Generation



Effects of attack π_i can be modeled as


$$\tilde{\gamma}_i(t) = \pi_i(\gamma_i(t)) = \gamma_i(t - \tau_i(t)) + \beta_i(t)$$

where β_i and τ_i are random variables, γ is the signal/information under attack.


- ❖ **False Data Injection (FDI) Attack:** $\tau_i = 0$ and $\beta_i \neq 0$ for $t \geq 0$
- ❖ **Time-Delay Switch (TDS) Attack:** $\tau_i \geq 0$ and $\beta_i = 0$ for $t \geq 0$

The proposed model covers weather effects on sensors and vehicle communication.

Attack and Fault Generation




CAV under Attack



Autonomous Race Vehicle

Our Research:

- Testing and Verification of CAV
- Testing V2P interactions
- Testing and training human and CAV interactions
- Digital Twin and Mixed Reality Platform
- Drive by Wire Table for Racing Vehicle
- Autonomous Racing Vehicle
- Autonomous Golf Cart
- Vehicle Simulator



Towards Autonomy





Q/A

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